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I.

INTRODUCTION

Can a Florida trial court lawfully enforce a provision in a marital settlement agreement that imputes future income to one of the spouses for purposes of calculating child support? Consider the following hypothetical:
husband and wife were married for three years during which the wife remained out of the workforce to give birth to the parties' two children. At the
time of divorce, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement,'
which provided the wife with rehabilitative alimony for a three-year period
post divorce. The parties further agreed that at the end of the rehabilitative
alimony period, a minimum of $50,000 income would be imputed to the
wife, based on her last date of employment, for the purpose of calculating
child support. The imputation would take effect upon the termination of the
wife's rehabilitative alimony-nearly three years after the entry of the final
judgment of dissolution and, more significantly, nearly six years since the
wife's last date of employment. In that same period of time, the wife
+

Title attributed to Yogi Berra (1925 - ).
J.D., Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 1989; B.S. The Pennsylvania State University,
1986; Professor Arcaro is a tenured member of the Law Faculty at Nova Southeastern University.
**
J.D., Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, 2009; M.H.A., University of North Carolina, 1998; B.A., Duke University, 1995.
1. Marital Settlement Agreements will be referred to as MSAs for purpose of this article. MSAs are generally referred to as settlement agreements entered into by divorcing
spouses at the time of divorce and frequently include complete resolution of all claims arising
from the marriage.
*
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changed careers and remained involuntarily unemployed due to unforeseeable economic conditions.
The key issue in the case is the validity of the provision of the MSA that
purports to impute income to the wife three years post divorce and six years
after her last date of employment. If, at the end of her rehabilitative alimony
period, the wife files a Supplemental Petition for Modification of Child Support based upon her involuntary unemployment, will the court enforce the
parties' agreement? Is the wife stuck with a "bad fiscal bargain" resulting
from the imputation of income as set forth in the parties' marital settlement
agreement? Is the imputation a bad but, in the husband's view, nonetheless
valid and enforceable provision of the MSA? Or, does the executory imputation of income that is now currently unavailable to the wife due to prevailing
economic conditions function as a partial waiver of child support
in contra2
vention of Florida's strong public policy against such waivers?
The following analysis will demonstrate that it is improper-and therefore reversible error-for a Florida court to apply principles of pure contract
law to enforce an MSA provision that imputes future income to a spouse for
purposes of calculating child support. Even where the trial court has ratified
an MSA that imputes future income for purposes of calculating child support, the agreed-upon imputation is unenforceable as a matter of public policy and law. Florida trial courts must make findings of fact as to a party's
current income or as to that party's underemployment or unemployment in
order to impute income pursuant Florida's child support law. 3 Using the
above hypothetical, Part I of this article will discuss the enforceability of pre
and postnuptial agreements presented in divorce proceedings in Florida. Part
II of the article will briefly discuss the evolution of child support guidelines
in Florida and the influence of federal law in this area. Part III will discuss
relevant case law addressing the substantive and procedural considerations to
properly impute income for purposes of calculating child support in Florida.
Part IV will conclude that agreements as to the future imputation of income
for the purpose of calculating child support are not binding, valid or enforceable on the parties because Florida courts retain jurisdiction to review and
modify such agreements consistent with the child's best interests and the fair
application of the child support guidelines. 4

2. See Brock v. Hudson, 494 So. 2d 285, 286-87 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Warrick
v. Hender, 198 So. 2d 348, 351 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1967).
3. See FLA. STAT. § 61.29 (2010). Florida Statutes section 61.29 establishes the principles for creating public policy regarding child support guidelines within the State of Florida
4. See id. § 61.29(3).
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II.

FLORIDA'S APPROACH TO FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN

DISSOLUTION PROCEEDINGS

The desire for private ordering of one's own financial affairs is commonplace in domestic relations cases. The value of personal autonomy when
dealing with unique, personal, and sensitive subjects like raising children and
ensuring financial stability cannot be understated. A divorcing couple electing to resolve their legal disputes by agreement may generally do so with few
obstacles imposed by law. There are three significant areas in dissolution of
marriage proceedings where a party's economic interests are directly implicated: equitable distribution, alimony, and child support.5 Although each
interest is not presented in every case, these interests can individually and
collectively
provide compelling justifications to motivate and inspire settle6
ment.

In Florida, those settlements may manifest in a variety of circumstances,
but they are generally categorized by the timing of the agreement-pre or
postmarital. 7 Section 61.079 of the FloridaStatutes, also known as the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), governs premarital agreements
entered into on or after October 1, 2007.8 This statute expressly states that
"[t]he right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement." 9 The adverse effects cautioned against include a waiver of
a party's duty to provide financial support to his or her minor children. 10
Such waivers are void and will not be enforced by Florida courts.11 The
standard for setting aside a premarital agreement is also laid out in the
UPAA. 12 A party may petition the court to set aside or refuse to enforce a
premarital agreement if the party proves procedural unfairness related to the

5. See Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958). This article
will focus on post-nuptial agreements to impute future income to a spouse post-divorce for
purposes of calculating child support at a future date. Agreements to impute future income to
a party for purposes of calculating child support at a future date outside the context of divorce
proceedings are treated similarly even though the parties were never married.
6. See id.
7. Prenuptial agreements are also referred to as "antenuptial" agreements. See Conlan
v. Conlan, 43 So. 3d 931 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010). Antenuptial and prenuptials are
agreements entered into prior to the date of the marriage while postnuptial agreements are
entered into subsequent to the date of the marriage.
8. FLA. STAT. § 61.079.
9. Id. § 61.079(4)(b).

10. Cronebaugh v. Van Dyke, 415 So. 2d 738, 741 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Armour v. Allen, 377 So. 2d 798, 799-800 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).

11.

Id.at 800.

12.

FLA. STAT. §

61.079.
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execution of the agreement.1 3 Additionally, the agreement may be set aside
where it was unconscionable at the time of execution and there was insufficient disclosure of a party's financial position.' 4 Finally, there are circumstances where a specific provision found within the agreement is not enforceable as a matter of law even though the agreement as a whole is valid. 5
By contrast, postnuptial agreements and MSAs are not codified in the
Florida Statutes per se. However, the Florida Statutes contemplate-and
indeed presume-that such agreements will be entered into regarding marital
assets and liabilities, alimony and child-related issues.1 6 Case law is unequivocal that MSAs are to be interpreted and enforced like other contracts. 7 As
such, the trial court generally lacks discretion to refuse to enforce the provisions of an MSA.18 The Supreme Court of Florida made clear in its decision
in Casto v. Casto'9 that:
13. Id. § 61.079(7)(a)(2) (providing that the agreement shall be unenforceable where
"[t]he agreement was the product of fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching").
14. Id. § 61.079(7)(a)(3) (providing that the agreement shall be unenforceable where it
was unconscionable at the time of execution, and "a. [The party] was not provided a fair and
reasonable disclosure of the [other party's financial assets and liabilities]; b. Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any fight to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; and c. Did not have, or reasonably
could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the
other party.").
15. See, e.g., Griffith v. Griffith, 860 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
16. For a discussion of equitable distribution, see FLA. STAT. § 61.075(3) (2010). "In any
contested dissolution action wherein a stipulation and agreement has not been entered and
filed, any distribution of marital assets or marital liabilities shall be supported by factual findings in the judgment or order based on competent substantial evidence ....
Id. (emphasis
added). For a discussion of mediation of contested issues, see id. § 61.183(2). "If an agreement is reached by the parties on the contested issues, a consent order incorporating the
agreement shall be prepared by the mediator and submitted to the parties and their attorneys
for review." Id. See also Griffith, 860 So. 2d at 1073 (holding that marital settlement agreements are highly favored in the law).
17. Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1987); Griffith, 860 So. 2d at 1073; Maas v.
Maas, 440 So. 2d 494, 495-96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The difficulty in reconciling the
two differing interests in marital settlement agreements is not a new one, as the Second District Court of Appeal acknowledged. Mass, 440 So. 2d at 495-96 ("We run headlong into
some troublesome precedents, however, in trying to reconcile the statutory obligation of the
trial judge 'to do equity and justice between the parties' that is supported by case law, and the
principle that property settlement agreements between husband and wife, made in contemplation of dissolution proceedings, should be construed and interpreted as other contracts.").
Perhaps the court, in its focus on fairness between the parties and in contemplation that inadequate support for minor children would provide grounds to invalidate an MSA notwithstanding the voluntary nature of the agreement, resolves this tension by implicitly considering
minor or dependent children as unwilling parties to the MSA.
18. Griffith, 860 So. 2d at 1073.
19. 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987).
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[T]he fact that one party to the agreement apparently made a bad
bargain is not a sufficient ground, by itself, to vacate or modify a
settlement agreement.... A bad fiscal bargain that appears unreasonable can be knowledgeably entered into for reasons other than
insufficient knowledge of assets and income. There may be a desire to leave the marriage for reasons unrelated to the parties' fiscal
position. If an agreement
that is unreasonable is freely entered in20
to, it is enforceable.
As a result, Florida courts are not empowered to second-guess the wisdom or fairness of a party's MSA when the agreement is centered upon financial issues such as alimony, equitable distribution of marital assets, and
liabilities and the payment of attorneys' fees. 1
Although stipulations entered into by the parties "are generally binding
on the parties and the court, ' 22 Florida law is well established that any childrelated provisions of a marital agreement, be it pre or postmarital in timing,
are always reviewable by the trial court. 23 The trial court is duty-bound to
consider, above all else, the best interests of the child in determining whether
the provisions of a marital agreement are enforceable. 24 Thus, a dichotomy
arises when provisions of a marital agreement regarding collateral issues
have a significant impact on child-related issues, particularly child support.
Florida law is clear regarding the right of a child to receive financial support
from a parent. That right may not be adversely affected by an agreement of
the parents.25

20. Id. at 334. Although the parties in Casto did not have children and consequently no
child-related provisions were at issue, the case remains instructive legal authority on the validity and enforcement of MSAs.
21. Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958). Sedell set
precedent in Florida when the First District Court of Appeal found pre-marital agreements to
"be respected by the courts ...when such agreements are fairly entered into and are not
tainted by fraud, overreaching or concealment." Id.
22. Griffith, 860 So. 2d at 1073.
23. See, e.g., Feliciano v. Feliciano, 674 So. 2d 937, 937 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(per curiam); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 583 So. 2d 415, 416 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c) (2010) ("The court shall determine all matters
relating to parenting and time-sharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the
see also id. § 61.13(3) ("For purposes of establishing or modbest interests of the child .. ");
ifying parental responsibility and creating, developing, approving, or modifying a parenting
plan, including a time-sharing schedule, which governs each parent's relationship with his or
her minor child and the relationship between each parent with regard to his or her minor child,
the best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration.").
25. See, e.g., id. § 61.079(4)(b) ("The right of a child to support may not be adversely
affected by a premarital agreement."). Although the statute specifically references premarital
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Arguably, any financial provision of an MSA may be construed to have
an impact on the parties' minor children, including provisions concerning
ostensibly unrelated issues such as equitable distribution and the payment of
each party's attorney's fees and costs. Although such provisions are enforceable as a matter of contract law, these provisions also directly impact the
financial resources available to each party, which indirectly impacts the parties' available net resources that could otherwise be spent on the support of
the minor children. 26 In sum, the FloridaStatutes have only codified premarital agreements, and specifically provide for judicial review of child-related
provisions under the best interests standard. 27 Although postmarital agreements have not been codified by statute, they also require judicial review of
child-related provisions under the best interest standard.28
II.

FLORIDA'S CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES

Florida's approach to child support has been directly influenced by the
encroachment of federal law into an area of concern that historically had
been left to state discretion. Federal law regarding the support of minor
children has evolved from the Child Support Enforcement Act of 1974,29 the
Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984,30 and the Family Support
Act of 1988,31 before resulting in the current statutory framework.32 The
Family Support Act of 1988 addressed a number of objectives, among which
the most important were to enhance the adequacy of child support orders, to
improve the equity of such orders by assuring more comparable treatment for
cases with similar circumstances, to increase compliance as a result of the
perceived new fairness, and finally, to improve the efficiency of adjudicating
child support orders.33
States currently receive federal funds for the support of children through
two related provisions of Title IV of the Social Security Act.34 A state is
eligible to receive federal block grants under Part A so long as the state has
agreements, Florida law is consistent in this prohibition whether the agreement was entered
into pre- or post-nuptial.
26. See generally id. § 61.13.
27. See Kennedy, 583 So. 2d at 416.
28. See id.
29. Child Support Enforcement Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1974).
30. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305
(1984).
31. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617, 651-669(b) (2006).
33. See Family Support Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 2343, 2343-44.
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617,651-669(b).
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adopted measures for the establishment and enforcement of child support in
compliance with the provisions of Part D, also known as the Child Support
Enforcement Act.35 Under Part D, each state must establish child support
guidelines that take into consideration all earnings of the obligor parent and
the reasonable needs of the child. 36 Federal law provides a rebuttable presumption that the amount of support calculated by the guidelines is correct,
while simultaneously allowing for deviations from the guideline amount
based on individual circumstances where the strict application of the guidelines would result in an inappropriate level of support. Any such deviation
must be based on written findings of fact and consider the best interests of
the child.3 8 Although guidelines need not be binding, "properly developed
guidelines can have substantial benefits if parents, attorneys and agencies
know... [they] will be applied in each case, except when [a] court... determines that exceptional circumstances warrant deviation. 39
Florida child support law has evolved in conjunction with federal law.
The child support guidelines found in section 61.30 of the Florida Statutes
are based on the combined net incomes of both parents, representing the total
monthly net income available to support the parties' children subject to this
order. 4° Chapter 61 provides the statutory approach for the imputation of
income to a parent that is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 4 ' As
required by federal law, the statute provides a rebuttable presumption that the
amount of support calculated per the guidelines is the proper and necessary
amount.42 The resulting support obligation is divided between the parents

35. Id. § 602(a). Part A is not relevant to this discussion other than as the carrot with
which the federal government coerces state implementation of the provisions of part D; therefore, the remainder of this section will focus on Part D.
36. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c) (2009).
37. Id. § 302.56(f)-(g).
38. Id. § 302.56(g).
39. ROBERT G. WILLIAMS, DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS I6 (1987).
40. FLA. STAT § 61.30(5) (2010); "This" order takes into consideration that the parties
may in fact have other children not subject to a current calculation. Florida law provides for
prioritizing child support obligations so that net income spent by an obligor on a preexisting
child support order reduces the obligor's net income available to support subsequent born
children. See id. § 61.30 (12)(a)-(c).
41. Id. § 61.30(2)(a)(14)(b).
42. Id. § 61.14(l)(a). Section 61.14 provides the mechanism by which a party may petition the court to enforce or modify child support orders as follows:
When a party is required by court order to make any [support] payments, and the circumstances or the financial ability of either party changes ... either party may apply... for an or-

der decreasing or increasing the amount of support... and the court has jurisdiction to make
orders as equity requires, with due regard to the changed circumstances or the financial ability
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according to each parent's proportionate share of the combined net incomes. 43 Deviation from the guidelines is permissible upon factual findings
by the trial court to support such a deviation, including an analysis of factors
related to the reasonable needs of the child. 44
Florida child support law is found in three separate statutes of Chapter
61: the first addresses establishment of a child support order,45 the second
addresses modification of such orders, 46 and the third addresses the amount
of such orders.47 In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, "the court may at
any time order either or both parents who owe a duty of support to a child to
pay support .. .in accordance with the child support guidelines .. . in
s[ection] 61.30.,,48 The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to modify the
amount and terms and conditions of the child support payments when the
modification is found necessary by the court in the best interests of the 49child
or when there is a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties.
Florida law provides for the imputation of income to an unemployed or
underemployed parent for the purpose of calculating child support.50 The
statute, effective until January 1, 2011, requires the trial court to impute inof the parties or the child, decreasing, increasing, or confirming the amount of separate support, maintenance, or alimony provided for in the.. . order.

43.
44.

FLA. STAT. § 61.30(10).
Id. § 61.30(1)(a), (I1)(a). Section 61.30(1)(a) of the FloridaStatutes (1)(a) states:

The trier of fact may order payment of child support which varies, plus or minus 5 percent,
from the guideline amount, after considering all relevant factors, including the needs of the
child or children, age, station in life, standard of living, and the financial status and ability of
each parent. The trier of fact may order payment of child support in an amount which varies
more than 5 percent from such guideline amount only upon a written finding explaining why
ordering payment of such guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate.

Id. § 61.30(1)(a).
45. Id. § 61.13.
46. Id. § 61.14.
FLA. STAT. § 61.30.
48. Id. § 61.13(l)(a); Section 742.031(1) of the Florida Statutes also requires that the
child support guidelines in section 61.30 be utilized when court orders for child support arise
out of a hearing for a determination of parentage. Id. § 742.031 (1)(a). Chapter 61 is also to
be used to calculate a child support order if the support order arises from Chapter 39 regarding
judicial proceedings that relate to "the care, safety and protection of children." Id. §
39.001(l)(a), (16).
49. Id. § 61.14(1)(a). Section 61.14 provides the mechanism by which a party may petition the court to enforce or modify child support orders as follows:
47.

[Wihen a party is required by court order to make any [support] payments, and the circumstances or the financial ability of either party changes.., either party may apply.., for an order decreasing or increasing the amount of support.. . and the court has jurisdiction to make
orders as equity requires, with due regard to the changed circumstances or the financial ability
of the parties or the child, decreasing, increasing, or confirming the amount of separate support, maintenance, or alimony provided for in the ...order.
FLA. STAT. § 61.14(l)(a).

50. See id. § 61.30(2)(b).
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come to a parent -":hois unemployed or underemployed when "such unemployment or underemployment is found by the court to be voluntary on that
parent's part, absent a finding of fact by the court of physical or mental incapacity or other circumstances over which the parent has no control.""1 In
order for the trial court to impute income the court must make a finding of
fact "that the parent is not currently using his or her best efforts to obtain
employment. ' ' 52 Incorporated into this concept is the finding that the party
not only has chosen to earn less money, but also has the ability to remedy his
or her situation by obtaining employment at a higher rate of pay. 53 Following such a determination, the trial court must examine "the employment potential and probable earnings level of the parent... based upon his or her
qualifications, and prevailing earnings
recent work history, occupational
54
level in the community.,
As previously noted, the Florida Legislature has crafted a new child
support statute which takes effect January 1, 2011 and codifies much of Florida's recent common law regarding the methodology of imputing income.55
The statute further provides a rebuttable presumption that the appropriate
level of income to impute is the "income equivalent to the median income of
year-round full-time workers." 56 Arguably, the most significant statutory
change impacts the use of stale employment records and unreasonable assumptions regarding employment opportunities. Florida courts are now prohibited from imputing income based upon:
[i]ncome records that are more than [five] years old at the time of
the hearing or trial at which imputation is sought; or [i]ncome at a
level that a party has never earned in the past, unless recently degreed, licensed, certified, relicensed, or recertified and thus qualified for, subject to geographic location, with due consideration of
the parties' existing time-sharing schedule and their historical exercise of the
time-sharing provided in the parenting plan or rele57
vant order.

51. Id.
52. Wendel v. Wendel, 852 So. 2d 277, 283 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Desilets v.
Desilets, 377 So. 2d 761, 764 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
53. Greene v. Greene, 547 So. 2d 1302, 1303 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
54. FLA. STAT. § 61.30(2)(b).
55. Act effective Jan. 1, 2011, ch. 2010-199, 2010 Fla. Laws 2405.
56. Id. at ch. 2010-199, § 5(2)(b), 2010 Fla. Laws 2405, 2410.
57. Id. at ch. 2010-199, § 5(2)(b)(2)(a.)-(b.), 2010 Fla. Laws 2405, 2411.
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The trial court must support any order of income imputation with a finding of competent substantial evidence. 58 The burden of proof is on the party
arguing in favor of income imputation 59 to present sufficient evidence at trial
to provide a realistic basis for imputing income to the unemployed or underemployed parent.6° Likewise, the party arguing for the imputation of income must demonstrate that such employment is currently available to the
other parent at that rate of pay, considering his or her age, work history, and
other qualifications.6 1 Income cannot be imputed to a party at a level he or
she has never earned.62 Importantly, the new statute also provides the trial
court with authority to impute income to a parent who falls to provide adequate financial information in a child support proceeding. 63 This approach
creates incentives for full participation from both parents given the rebuttable
presumption that the imputed income is available to the parent who is unemployed or underemployed. 64 This legislative evolution reflects the trial
court's important role as the primary authority in determining the propriety
of imputing income to a party in child support proceedings.65
58. See Sallaberry v. Sallaberry, 27 So. 3d 234, 236 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per
curiam) ("The trial court's imputation of income must be supported by competent, substantial
evidence.").
59. See Zarycki-Weig v. Weig, 25 So. 3d 573, 575 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per
curiam) ("The spouse claiming that the other spouse is voluntarily unemployed bears the
burden of proof.").
60. See, e.g., Heidisch v. Heidisch, 992 So. 2d 835, 837 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
"'[Tihere must be some realistic basis in the evidence to support the concept that the former
spouse can earn the sums imputed."' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Greene v. Greene,
895 So. 2d 503, 512 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005), overruled on other grounds by, Price v.
Price, 951 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007)); Schlagel v. Schlagel, 973 So. 2d 672,
674-75 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that vocational expert's report contained competent, substantial evidence that employment as a legal assistant, legal recruiter and paralegal
was available in the local market for the former wife who had her law degree but unsuccessfully attempted the Florida Bar exam four times and gave up on the idea of being a lawyer).
61. Lee v. Lee, 751 So. 2d 741, 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam) (reversing
imputation of income where the former husband was terminated from his most recent job;
although he was interviewing for new employment, his efforts had not resulted in new employment); Gildea v. Gildea, 593 So. 2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam); Ensley v. Ensley, 578 So. 2d 497,498 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
62. Stein v. Stein, 701 So. 2d 381, 381 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("[I]ncome may not
be imputed at a level which the former spouse has never earned, absent special circumstances.").
63. FLA. STAT. § 61.30 (2)(b) (2010). "If the information concerning a parent's income is
unavailable, a parent fails to participate in a child support proceeding or a parent fails to
supply adequate financial information .... income shall be automatically imputed to the parent, and there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent has [the] income .... " Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. §§ 61.29, .30.
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Determining the proper amount of income to impute is particularly difficult for the trial court when a parent has been out of the workforce for a
long period of time in order to stay home to care for young children or when
a parent has voluntarily left the workforce to obtain education or training for
a different career.66 These cases are problematic, due to the parent's absence
from the workforce for extended periods of time. 67 Although the trial court
is required to assess the parent's recent work history and occupational qualifications, the parent may not have any recent work history to assess. Alternatively, the parent's occupational qualifications may be outdated due to
circumstances beyond that parent's control.69
Florida law requires that the child support order include a schedule of
income "based on the record existing at the time of the order., 70 Because the
statute requires the income used for calculating child support be factually
supported by the trial record, it is reversible error for the court to impute income to a parent using outdated income figures. 7 1 The statutory factors that
the court must consider in imputing current income may change significantly
over time.72 Therefore, any agreement imputing future income to a party
must necessarily bow to the statutory dictates of section 61.16 and the court's
required consideration of the best interests of the child whose financial support is based on the imputed income.7 3 Supporting this rationale is Eaton v.
Eaton,74 where the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that child support
orders "are, by their very nature, impermanent in character and hence are res
judicata of the issues only so long as the facts and circumstances
of the par' 75
ties remain the same as when the decree was rendered.

66. See Schlagel v. Schlagel, 973 So. 2d 672, 674-76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008);
Cushman v. Cushman, 585 So. 2d 485,486 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
67. Stein, 701 So. 2d at 381-82.
68. Id. at 381.
69. See Schlagel, 973 So. 2d at 674.
70. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1)(a)(1)(b).
71. See generally Wendel v. Wendel, 852 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 841 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Hanley v. Hanley, 734 So. 2d
529 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); see also Cushman, 585 So. 2d at 486.
72. Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697,700 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam).
73. Id.
74. 238 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
75. Id. at 168 (holding that a substantial change in circumstances, whether it be the needs
of the child or the obligor's ability to pay, is sufficient justification to modify a child support
order regardless of the provisions of the MSA).
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IV. IMPUTING INCOME FOR PURPOSES OF CALCULATING CHILD SUPPORT IN
FLORIDA

Imputing future income to a parent is precisely what the parties agreed
to in the hypothetical used in this article. The hypothetical MSA can be said
to fairly reflect the parties' intent and aspirations for the future income earning capacity of the wife. The parties endeavored to predict the future, but
their prediction was wrong. Is it the wife's error for which she must now
bear the responsibility of her bad fiscal bargain? Must the husband now
prove the wife's current income earning capacity when the parties' agreement clearly reflects the wife's imputed earnings? Most importantly, must
the children receive less child support because the parties' prediction of the
wife's future income level was overstated?
Florida law requires child support orders be based upon a finding of
76
present facts regarding current income earning capacity of the parties. Using a party's outdated earnings records from past employment when such
income levels are no longer available to the party violates the mandate that
the imputed income be presently available. 7 Florida appellate courts will
reject a trial court's findings as to imputed income when such findings are
not supported by substantial competent evidence. 78 While it may seem obvious that using employment records from eight years prior to the date of the
child support hearing was impermissible, 79 even employment records from
one year prior to the date of the hearing may be outdated and unreliable.8 °
Courts must closely examine past employment records to ensure they are
both probative of a party's earning capacity and reliable in representing a
party's current employability. 8 1 Imputation in every case will be fact specific
and unique to the circumstances of those particular parties.
An evidentiary record supporting the court's findings of fact must exist
in order for a judicial imputation of income to withstand appellate court scru76. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1)(a)(1)(b) (2010).
77. Wendel v. Wendel, 852 So. 2d 277, 285 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003). In Wendel, it
was reversible error for the court to impute income based on the former husband's income
from a period of time eight years prior to the child support hearing, even though the husband's
maximum income never again reached such a level. Id. at 283-84.
78. Id. at 285.
79. Id.
80. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 841 So. 2d 564, 570 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003). In Mitchell,
the trial court's use of income data from just one year prior to the date of the child support
hearing was reversible error where the party's actual income was rising well above the income
level utilized by the court. See id. at 569-71; see also Hanley v. Hanley, 734 So. 2d 529, 530
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
81. See Mitchell, 841 So. 2d at 571.
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tiny. For example, in Mitchell v. Mitchell,82 the Second District Court of
Appeal noted that the trial court found the wife was capable of earning
$40,000 per year, based on her recent training and work history.83 However,
the court imputed only "the more likely figure" of $25,000 per year! 4 The
Second District reversed the trial court's imputation of only $25,000 when
the record showed the wife was capable of earning $40,000 due to the trial
court's failure to make appropriate findings of fact. 85 The trial court's findings of fact as to the parties' incomes are necessary to ensure the proper application of the child support guideline calculations. 86 A court's failure to
include such findings for purposes of child support calculations renders a
final judgment facially erroneous."
In some cases, it is simply unrealistic to impute income that was earned
in a former career. In Shafer v. Shafer,88 the wife had practiced as an attorney for six years before moving to Florida. 89 However, when she moved to
Florida, she failed to pass the bar exam and worked instead for her husband
as a paralegal'9° This occupation lasted sixteen years, until the parties divorced.91 In calculating child support for the parties' minor children, the trial
court imputed income to the wife at a level earned by a practicing lawyer
even though she had not passed the Florida Bar exam. 92 On appeal, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal found that no competent substantial evidence
was presented regarding the wife's ability to pass the bar exam and practice
law. 93 .'[T]here must be some realistic basis in the evidence to support the
concept that the former spouse can earn the sums imputed.' 94 The court
reasoned that it was unrealisticto expect the wife to pass the bar exam when
she had been out of the profession for sixteen years.95 The wife's limited
abilities in the family law practice were not useful in this respect. 96 However, the court held that the case presented special circumstances which justi82. 841 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
83. Id. at 570.
84. Id. at 571.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Mitchell, 841 So. 2d at 571.
88. 45 So. 3d 494 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
89. Id. at 495.
90. Id. at 497.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 498
93. Shafer, 45 So. 3d at 497.
94. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Heidisch v. Heidisch, 992 So. 2d 835, 837 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 498.
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fled an imputation of income equal to that of equivalent occupations in the
community and different from the previous income. 97 The wife was not protected by the fact that she had accepted a below market salary in working
with her husband.98
Child support modification petitions are subject to the same basic analysis required for establishing support orders that impute income to one parent
even though the parties agreed to an amount of child support in an MSA. 99
The court must first determine the net income of each party; if one party is
unemployed or underemployed, the court must then determine whether the
reduction in earnings is voluntary in nature.'0° It is not enough to simply
plead that a parent's substantial change in circumstances necessitates a modification of child support; rather, Florida courts require that such a change be
involuntary. 10 1 Voluntary changes that would result in reduced child support
obligations will rarely satisfy the legal threshold for modification. Determining the "voluntariness" of a party's actions has developed as a safeguard in
part to ensure that
the duty to furnish adequate child support is not delibe10 2
rately avoided.
Settlement agreements that include provisions for automatic modifications of child support obligations based on future conditions are equally
problematic. In Penkoski v. Patterson,10 3 the parent's child support obligation increased automatically with the age of the child.' °4 The court first
noted that such automatic changes are disfavored by the law.10 5 The increase
in support occurred regardless of any external circumstances, in contravention of "the principle that support should be based upon need and ability to
pay. ' 6 "[Any standard which could force a party to accept a decree based
on clairvoyance of the trial judge would be [inferior to] 'one
which enables
7
the judge to make a decision based on present conditions."t0

97. Id.
98. Shafer, 45 So. 3d at 498. The court reasoned is that it is impossible to make a finding
of facts regarding child support based on evidence that is not available as of this date. Id.
99. Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So. 2d 811, 812-14 (Fla. 1997).
100. Id. at 814.
101. Id.; see also Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So. 2d 1250, 1250-51 (Fla. 1992) (McDonald, J.,
specially concurring); Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66, 68 (Fla. 1954); Deatherage v. Deatherage, 395 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), dismissed, 402 So. 2d 609 (Fla.
1981); In re Marriage of Johnson, 352 So. 2d 140, 141 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
102. Overbey, 698 So. 2d at 814.
103. 440 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (per curiam).
104. Id. at 46.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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A corollary to the MSA child support imputation cases is when a court
is called on to impute income to a parent who is incarcerated and unable to
earn income at his or her previous level.10 8 The incarceration cases provide
insight into the tension that exists when imputation of income is not supported by the factual reality of the parties' situation. These cases generally
arise when a party is seeking to modify an existing child support order. 1°9
Florida trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to modify original child support orders as necessary in the best interests of the child or based on a party's
substantial change in circumstances.'1 0
11
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Department of Revenue v. Jackson,
recognized the conflict inherent in the statute:
The instant action requires that this Court consider and address a
purported internal conceptual conflict between the provisions in
section 61.13 that provide a basis for the trial court to modify a
child support decree when it is necessary to the child's best interests, and those which allow modification when there is a substantial change in the parties' circumstances. It is abundantly clear that
a substantial change in circumstances, such as the incarceration of
an obligor, certainly may not produce a result that is in a child's
best interests. Although the public policy considerations underpinning the arguments on either side have some compelling components, in the instant situation we believe that the child's interest
in receiving his or her support monies must generally supersede
the obligor parent's substantial change in circumstance resulting
from incarceration. The full and timely remitting of child support
payments is certainly in the best interests of the supported child.
Therefore, any abatement or waiver of support payments
owed to
12
the child would certainly harm the interests of the child.'
The Court resolved this conflict by refusing to impute an income the incarcerated parent could not earn, while simultaneously refusing to eliminate
the parent's support obligation. 1 3 Instead, the trial court was instructed to
reserve judgment on the petition for modification until the parent's release
from custody. 1 4 At that time, the trial court should consider the petition for
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
1991)).
113.
114.

See e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. Jackson, 846 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2003).
Id. at 488.
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(l)(a) (2010); see also Jackson, 846 So. 2d at 489.
846 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2003).
Id. at 490 (citing Imami v. Imami, 584 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
See id. at 491.

Id.
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of all the parties
modification "in light of the contemporary' circumstances
5
involved and enter a judgment appropriate." "
Similarly, in McCall v. Martin," 6 the trial court also declined to impute
an income not earnable to an incarcerated parent for the purpose of calculating his child support obligation during his incarceration.' 1 7 However, the
appellate court held that it was reversible error not to impute some income
because the child's best interests are served by imputing income and establishing a support obligation that will be paid upon the father's release. 18 The
court noted that the income is imputed for the father's current obligation and
not for the purpose of establishing his future obligations." 9 The court is duty-bound to make a determination of fact as to 20the present situation of the
parties; executory finding of facts are forbidden.
Similar prohibitions exist in regards to predicting income levels at a future point in time for purposes of calculating alimony obligations. '2' In
Hamilton v. Hamilton,'2 the court concluded that it was reversible error for
the trial court to assign for alimony a future percentage of one party's special
bonuses. 23 The court expressed the view that such a proposition was neither
new, nor isolate. 124 Above all, the court expressed the view that what was
valid for alimony was clearly valid for child support as well:
The invalidity of this provision is further supported by this court's
statement in Penkoski v. Patterson,that "[j]udgments providing for

automatic changes in support payments are generally disfavored as
there is no evidentiary basis for the determination of future events,
when
and there exists an adequate procedure for modification
25
changes in the circumstances of the parties do occur.

115. Id. at 491 (citing Halliwell v. Halliwell, 741 A.2d 638, 646 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999)) (emphasis added).
116. 34 So. 3d 121 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
117. Id. at 122.
118. Id. at 123.
119. Id. (citing Jackson, 846 So. 2d at 493).
120. See id.; Jackson, 846 So. 2d at 493.
121. See e.g., Hamilton v. Hamilton, 552 So. 2d 929, 931 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
122. 552 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
123. Id. at 932.
124. Id. at 931; see also Davidson v. Davidson, 410 So. 2d 943, 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (finding that "change or termination of permanent or periodic alimony based on
the anticipated occurrence of an uncertain future event" is error).
125. Hamilton, 552 So. 2d at 931 (quoting Penkoski v. Patterson, 440 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (per curiam)).
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V.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that Florida law not only permits but also "encourage[s] fair
and efficient settlement of support issues between parents and minimizes the
need for litigation."' 126 However, Florida law is equally clear that the duty to
support one's minor children is a legally imposed obligation that cannot be
bargained away by the parties to an MSA.127 It is because of this juxtaposition that principles of pure contract law cannot apply to the enforcement of
an MSA that infringes upon a child's guaranteed right to support.
Applying Florida law to our hypothetical MSA, the court would be required to set aside the provision imputing income in order to provide the
necessary support for the minor children. At the time of execution of the
MSA, the former wife agreed to an imputation of $50,000 to her, based upon
her most recent earnings. If, however, she can earn only $25,000 with her
best efforts, imputing the full $50,000 essentially waives the difference in the
child support that would be calculated according to the guidelines based
upon the combined incomes of the former husband and former wife. Such a
waiver of support directly contravenes Florida's public policy against waiv128
ers of child support as found in the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.
Finally, the court must make written findings of fact 129
when calculating child
support; the court's failure to do so is reversible error.
An agreement that imputes future income to a party for purposes of calculating child support is not enforceable through contract law in Florida.
Pursuant to Chapter 61 of the FloridaStatutes, there are exceptions to basic
contract law principles that exist so as to ensure the well-being of children
and families.1 30 Florida law relieves a party from a bad fiscal bargain when
that bargain is centered on the imputation of future income for purposes of
calculating child support.
126. FLA. STAT. § 61.29 (2010).
127. See Cronebaugh v. Van Dyke, 415 So. 2d 738, 741 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Armour v. Allen, 377 So. 2d 798, 799-800 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
128. FLA. STAT. § 61.079; see also Wilkes v. Wilkes, 768 So. 2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2000) (finding that the husband's false financial affidavit resulted in the children
receiving a lower amount of financial support; although the wife's counsel failed to conduct
any discovery, thereby acquiescing to the husband's financial misstatements, "[tihe wife simply could not 'contract' away an amount of the children's support.").
129. MacRae-Billewicz v. Billewicz, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1898, 1899 (2d Dist. Ct. App.
Aug. 20, 2010) (holding that such findings of fact are necessary for calculating child support
pursuant to the guidelines). Implicit in this decision is the principle that parties cannot simply
agree as to their incomes without presenting competent substantial evidence to the court in
support of their assertions. Id.
130. See FLA. STAT. § 61.30(2)(b); Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).

